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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this
matter pursuant to U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(c) Replacement
Volume 9, 1987 Ed., and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appeal followed a jury verdict in Washington County Fifth
Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 881001374, finding Appellant
guilty of violating Sees. 2a(1) and (2) of the St. George City
Obscenity Ordinance (2-77-2), a Class B misdemeanor.

Appellant's

Motion to Dismiss was denied on March 28, 1989, and Appellant's
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal was denied by this Court on
April 24, 1989.

The case was tried October 3, 1989;

Appellant's

Motion for a Directed Verdict at the close of the City's case was
denied;

sentencing has not taken place.

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a small merchant can properly adorn the walls of his
shopf located in a neighborhood near a high school, with drawings
of a naked woman with her legs spread so as to expose her
genitals and a woman's vagina, together with several titles and
phrases, among other unrelated drawings and writings, under the
protection

of

Constitution

the

or

First

the

Amendment

Constitution

to
of

the

the

United

State

of

States
Utah.

Specifically, the questions raised are:
1.

Whether

the

St.

George

obscenity

ordinance

is

unconstitutional because it is over broad and proscribes material
that is not "obscene" under the Miller test.
2.

Whether the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied

because the shop's wall adornment has a "dominant theme" and is
not sufficiently offensive to pass a threshold test of obscenity.
3.

Whether the City bore its burden of proof so as to

permit the matter to be properly presented to a jury.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE
The St. George City obscenity ordinance stating
a.

No person shall knowingly:
(1)
(2)

distribute, display publicly, furnish or provide
to any person any obscene material or performance;
or
prepare, publish, print, create, advertise or
possess any obscene material or performance; or

must not be violative of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the government for redress of grievances.
or Article 1, Sec. 15 of the Constitution of the State of Utah:
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech or of the press . . .
when it defines obscenity in the following manner:
a.
"Obscene" is a word descriptive of any material or
performance which, when taken as a whole and considered in the
context of the contemporary standard of this community:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
Portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner;
Has no serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.

and sexual conduct, in pertinent part, as follows:
e. "Sexual conduct" includes any of the following described
forms of sexual conduct if depicted or described in a patently
offensive way:
(2)

Masturbation, excretion, excretory functions or lewd
exhibition of the genitals, including any explicit
close-up representation of a human genital organ or a
spread eagle exposire of female genital organs.

3

STATEMENT
1.

The Defendant operated a retail establishment vending

hard rock music albums and T-shirts to the public from a small
signless store open during evening hours only.

The complex where

it was located is on the access road to a high school three
blocks away.

The Defendant was cited for utilizing an obscene

display as a part of wall hangings visible to anyone entering the
door of the shop.
2.

The wall hangings, characterized by the trial judge as a

collage of assorted themes, contained a drawing (apparently with
spray paint) of a nude female lying on her back with her legs
spread so as to display pubic hair and genitalia.
large colored depiction of a vagina.

Alongside is a

Juxtaposed

around the

sketches are phrases such as "tuna factory", "eat me", "eat it",
and "tunnel of love".

Other representations sketched onto the

wall hanging depict varied themes suggesting possibly politics
(with anti-social and anti-nuclear slogans), religion (with devil
worship
things.

symbols) and music
Significant

(with album titles) , among oth€>r

analysis

of

any

other

themes was not

undertaken at the trial.
3.

Evidence was introduced by the Respondent to show the

wall adornment displayed to the public, the presence of customers
including student-age individuals, Appellants relationship to
the shop and its display, and a determination by police officers
4

that

a violation

of the

obscenity

ordinance

existed.

The

Appellant put on evidence of the availability of materials in the
community that would

apparently violate the City/s obscenity

ordinance, and testimony that the wall decorations had political
and perhaps artistic value.

The wall hangings were placed in

evidence and spread on the floor of the courtroom for viewing by
the jury.
4.
work

in

The jury was instructed to apply the Miller test to the
question,

in

a

context

of

contemporary

community

standards, and it returned a verdict of guilty.

ARGUMENT:

SUMMARY

First, the ordinance is not unconstitutional.

The core of

the ordinance is a definition of "obscene" in Sec. 1(a), and that
definition faithfully tracks the definition provided in Miller v.
California, 413 US 15 at 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 at
431.

To avoid vagueness, the ordinance proceeds to further

define words used in that definition;

Appellant urges that one

of these further definitions causes the ordinance to become overbroad rather than further narrowing the ordinance as was intended
by the Respondent.

Specifically, the definition

of

"sexual

conduct" as encompassing a "lewd exhibition of the genitals,
including any explicit close-up representation of a human genital
5

organ or a spread-eagle exposure of female genital organs" (Sec.
1(e)(2)) seems to the be offending portion of the ordinance.
However, that language is equivalent to the "lewd exhibition of
the genitals" which is specifically mentioned in Miller as an
example

of the type of sexual conduct that can properly be

considered

obscene.

The addition of those words

creates a

tighter, not broader, ordinance which is constitutional within
the clear meaning of the cases.
Second, application of the ordinance to the wall hanging in
question

is constitutional

and appropriate.

The total wall

hanging, comprising three bed sheets, is a collage or assortment
of various themes with nothing dominant, neither
political.

sexual nor

However, the portion of the wall-hanging where a

semi-recumbent

female

figure

spreads

her

legs

to

show

her

genitals with the blown-up representation of a vagina alongside,
in the context of the surrounding written material, have a sole
theme

-

sexual

conduct that fits within the definition of

"obscene" contained in the ordinance.

At trial, Appellant was

unable either to minimize the sexual theme in that portion of the
wall-covering or to establish a single, different theme for the
wall-covering as a whole.

Different artists were involved, and

each section of the bed sheets must be looked upon individually
in the same way as a painting in a gallery or a magazine in a
bookstore.
6

Third, the Respondent met its burden of proof.

The City

introduced evidence of the offending material and through the
scrutiny of its officers characterized it as obscene within the
definition of the ordinance.
that

there

was

serious

When the Appellant sought to show

political

or

artistic

value,

the

Respondent called a further witness to rebut that effort.

The

evidence introduced by Respondent was sufficient to cause the
court to doubt the existence of any serious political or artistic
value, and it allowed the case to go to the jury;

the evidence

was sufficient for the jury to apply a coiamunity standard and
determine that the work was intended to appeal to the prurient
interest and
offensive way.

that

it depicted

sexual conduct in a patently

There is no burden on the Respondent to introduce

expert testimony of the community standard or extensive evidence
beyond the offending material itself.

ARGUMENT:
1.

Constitutionality of Ordinance.

issues presented
ordinance

ELABORATION

be

In his statement of

for review, the Appellant requests that the

examined

for

both

over-breadth

and

vagueness.

However, his argument seems to be directed primarily at the
breadth of material brought within the definition of obscenity by
the ordinance, urging that sexual conduct must necessarily
7

involve "sexual action", and the mere spreading of legs in a lewd
manner

so

as

to

expose

the genitals

is not

sufficient to

constitute obscenity.
a.

It should be established initially that the three-part

test adopted by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California, supra,
is the acceptable definition for obscenity now utilized by all
courts.

Appellant is fond of the word "hard core" and uses it

over 20 times in his brief, but there is no accepted court
definition of "hard core". Rather, it is an easy way to refer to
materials

meeting

the Miller

test, and

it

is

appropriately

referred to by Justice Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 US 184 at 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, as a "shorthand
description".

The Ninth Circuit correctly notes that the "courts

have insisted that the Miller guidelines be followed without
deviation".

J-R Distributors, Inc. v. Eikenberry* 725 F.2d 482

at 489 (1984) . *1

Those guidelines are utilized by the ordinance

in question and provide the only standard recognized in this
argument.

*1
Rigid adherence, however, is not intended to prevent the
Respondent from further defining or elaborating on the definition
within the guidelines it sets; in Hamlinq v. United States, 418
US 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 at 619 it is pointed out
that the Miller case was not intended as a "legislative drafting
handbook".

8

b.

The Respondent's ordinance properly incorporates and

applies the Miller tests.

The kinds of sexual conduct made

"patently offensive" are those types of conduct suggested
by the "plain examples" given in Miller.

One of the two examples

given there includes a "lewd exhibition of the genitals".
at 25, 37 L.Ed.2d at 431.

413 US

See also Smith v. United States, 431

US 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 at 335.

To so display

one's genitals is to engage in "conduct" of the type referred to
in

Miller,

and

a

considered obscene.

depiction

of

that

type

can

properly

be

No case since Miller has held a lewd display

of genitals to not be obscene.

It should also be remembered that

the Miller tests are applied at all times in the context of
"community standards", *2 and while lewd exposure of the genitals
may not be considered obscene by one community standard, the
Respondent's ordinance is entitled to incorporate that particular
criteria into the matter to which the community standard is
applied.
c.

To find Respondent's ordinance not overly broad for

purposes of the Miller test is not to render it vague at the same
time.

The danger that court construction to narrow the ordinance

*2 The Miller case is even characterized by the court in Home
Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. 986 at 994 (Dist. Utah
1982) as "the Community standards7 case".

9

may in turn make it vague, discussed by Prof. Tribe and cited by
Appellant in Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. at
998, does not exist here.

As in the case of Smith v. United

States, 431 US 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 at 340, dealing
with the question of unconstitutional vagueness, the Respondent's
construction of the St. George ordinance "flows directly from the
decisions in Hamling, Miller, Reidel, and Roth.

As construed in

Hamling, the type of conduct covered by the (ordinance) can be
ascertained with sufficient ease to avoid due process pitfalls,"
and is therefore constitutional.
d.

By citing other instances where a display of genitals

has not been found to be obscene, Appellant may be attempting to
have

the

ordinance

declared

unconstitutional

because

of

overbreadth that threatens others not before the court (as in
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed 1093).
that

is the

case, Appellant

"lacks

standing

to

attack

If
the

constitutionality of the ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine
because he has not shown a 'real and substantial7 abridgment of
other innocent third persons' First Amendment rights."

Provo

City Corporation v. Willden, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1989) .

There

has been no evidence of potential injury to third parties, and
Appellant's arguments should be limited to the effect of the
ordinance upon him.

10

e.
George

If there were in fact an overbreadth aspect to the St.
ordinance,

narrowing
favored.

the

ordinance

(partial invalidation) .

is

readily

susceptible

to

Total invalidation is not

In a case where partial invalidation was found to be a

proper remedy, Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326 at 1335 (9th
Cir. 1987), Judge Wallace stated:
"Use of first amendment overbreadth doctrine to
invalidate a statute on its face is 'strong medicine.7
New York v. Ferber, 458 US 747, 769, 102 S.Ct. 3348,
3361, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916,
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). The remedy of total
invalidation is generally reserved for cases in
which the individual's own speech or expressive
conduct may validly be prohibited or sanctioned,
because the statute also threatens others not before
the court who desire to engage in protected expression
but who may be deterred from doing so. Spokane Arcades,
472 US at 503, 105 S.Ct. at 2802. In such cases, the
challenged statute must be 'substantially' overbroad
in relation to its legitimate reach. Id. at 503 n. 12,
105 S.Ct. at 2802 n. 12."
See also Home Box Office v. Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. 986 at 991;
Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 US 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45
L.Ed.2d 125 at 135; and State v. Haiq, 578 P.2d 837 at 841 (Utah
1978) .
The court should be even less prone to find an ordinance
unconstitutional for overbreadth where conduct is involved as
well as speech.

"When conduct plus speech is involved, the

overbreadth must be 'real' and 'substantial' in relation to an
ordinance before it can be declared invalid on its face."

Upper

Midwest Book Sellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 at
11

1391

(8th

Cir.

1985) .

As

in

the

case

of

the

Minneapolis

ordinance, the St. George ordinance relates to both conduct and
speech because it regulates the manner in which certain speech
may

be

disseminated.

The

ordinance

is

not

substantially

overbroad and should not be facially invalidated.
f.

The

Appellant

unconstitutionality
discussed

by

the

of
Utah

bears

the

the

burden

Respondent's

Supreme

Court

of

showing

ordinance.

in Provo

City

the

This

is

Corp.

v.

Willden, supra, citing Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035,
1037

(Utah 1975), cert, denied, 425 US 915, 96 S.Ct. 1514, 47

L.Ed.2d 766 (1976):
"The defendant attacked the constitutionality of the
ordinance by contending that its wording was overbroad and vague. 541 P.2d at 103 6. We held that the
party alleging the unconstitutionality of an ordinance
or statute must overcome three hurdles, as follows:
(a)
(b)

(c)

A legislative enactment is presumed to be
valid and in conformity with the constitution;
(The statute or ordinance) should not be held
to be invalid unless it is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt to be incompatible with some
particular constitutional provision; and
The burden of showing invalidity of an
ordinance or statute is upon the one who
makes the challenge.

541 P.2d at 1037 (footnotes omitted)."
The Appellant has not borne the burden of proving the ordinance
unconstitutional.
2.
Case.

Constitutional

Application

of

the Ordinance

in This

The subject matter to which the ordinance was applied was

12

obscene within the definition of that ordinance, and the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion in submitting the matter to a
jury for application of the community standard.

The depictions

in question (Transcript, pp. 144 and 194) are not "simple nudity"
or "nudity alone", as referenced

in Appellant's brief;

the

Defendant himself described one of the depictions as "a very
enlarged portion of the girl's pubic area" (Transcript, p. 227)
and states that the "tunnel of

love" represents "a girl's

vagina" (Transcript, pp. 228-229).
a.

There is a misconception that to be obscene something

must necessarily be sexy or erotic.

A City police officer

testified that perhaps the word "prurient" was to be applied only
to something that sexually excites him, and the Appellant seeks
to perpetuate that error.

It is not necessary for the ordinance

to define "prurient interest", *3 and it is amply treated and
defined by various cases. *4

The depictions on the bed sheet are

*3 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. (1985), 472 US 491, 503 n.
13, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2803 n. 13, 86 L.Ed.2d 394, 407 n. 13;
People v. Sequoia Books, Inc.. 513 N.E.2d 1154 (111. App. 2 Dist.
1987) .
*4 e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.. supra; Polykoff v.
Collins, supra. The definition not only includes a morbid or
curious interest in sex, but even such non-sexual things as
excretion.
Even Justice Brennan agrees that if materials are
denied First Amendment protection because they are "patently
offensive" to the average citizen, "the element of erotic appeal"
may not be important. Smith v. United States. 431 US 291 at 430,
n. 20, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 at 347, n. 20. Sexual
arousal need not necessarily be a dimension of the material to
which an obscenity ordinance is properly applied.
13

lewd, and they may or may not be considered

erotic by the

beholder, but they can be obscene either way.
b.

The

Appellant

seeks

by

other

decisions

involving

different materials to catalog specific depictions into obscene
or non-obscene categories on an overall basis rather than to
permit a customized application of the Miller test in each case.
He would urge, for example, that if a display of genitals in a
magazine sold in New York was held not to be obscene, any display
of genitals, therefore, should be categorized as non-obscene.
This approach not only negates the application
standards, but it poses inherent dangers.
States v.

Womack,

emphasizes

that

variations

in

consequences

509

"it

F.2d

is

format

368

in obscenity

For example, in United

(D.C. Cir. 1974) the court

important
may

of community

well

to

realize

produce

determinations."

that

vastly

'slight'
different

To determine the

"prurient interest" and "patently offensive" prongs of the Miller
test by using a yardstick of "comparable" materials from another
context is to oversimplify;

the jury verdict must have the right

to decide whether it is reasonable to find the specific material
in this case to be obscene in the context where it was found.
Hamlina v. United States, 418 US 87 at 104, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41
L.Ed.2d

590

at

613

recognizes

a close analogy

between

the

function of "contemporary community standard" in obscenity cases
and

"reasonableness"

in

other

cases.
14

What

may

have

been

considered

non-obscene

by

another

court

does

not

make

it

unreasonable for the jury to find related material obscene in
this case.

While a verdict is clearly reviewable for sufficiency

and compliance with the Miller limitations, jurors should not
normally be reversed when they decide a question of obscenity "in
accordance with their own understanding of the tolerance of the
average person in their community."

Smith v. United States,

supra.
c.

The

evidence showed that the Appellant's

shop was

patronized by juveniles (Transcript, pp. 23 6 and 121).

The cases

recognize that a municipality can adopt more stringent controls
on materials available to youths than on those available to
adults.

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20

L.Ed.2d 195 (1968);

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 US

205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Utah in State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837 (1978) has recognized that
the opinion in Miller "was predicated on the theory the State had
a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition
of obscene materials when the mode of dissemination carried with
it

a

significant

danger

of

offending

the

sensibilities

unwilling recipients, or exposure to juveniles."

of

The ordinance

in question does not set a different standard for juveniles, but
in applying that ordinance to the facts, the court and jury had a
right

to

consider

the

manner

in
15

which

the

material

was

communicated and to whom it was communicated.

They are entitled

to evaluate the context in which the Miller test (including the
community standard) is to be applied.

Even Justice Brennan in

his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 US 49 at 84, 93
S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 at 473 recognizes that "the obscenity
of any particular item may depend upon nuances of presentation
and

the

context

of

its

dissemination",

further

indicating

specifically that "distribution to juveniles" has a bearing "upon
the determination of obscenity."
d.

If the wall hangings had a dominant theme, and that

dominant theme were political or artistic, the trial judge may
have appropriately found that the third prong of the Miller test
was

not met

and denied

submission

of the

case

to a jury.

However, the judge found that the sum total of the bedsheets was
a collage, "a whole group of unrelated things that happened to be
juxtaposed next to one another".

At page 207 of the Transcript

he states:
" . . . since there appears to me to not be an overriding
theme in these banners or these bed sheets, I think we
can look at each part individually."
The court was correct in treating the wall hanging as divisible
into sub-works rather than treating the entire decoration as a

16

single work, particularly since he determined after a review of
the various parts that there was not a dominant theme.
e.

It may be well to note here that the ordinance was not

applied to suppress First Amendment items, it rather was applied
to regulate the manner of display of the materials in question.
That is significant in applying the Miller reference to taking
the work "as a whole", as that phrase is intended to apply in a
setting of suppression, not regulation.

Books and magazines for

sale that are "plainly divisible" into separate parts nonetheless
may

be

considered

obscenity;

as

a

whole

for

purposes

of

determining

that is not true where one deals with the display of

objectionable materials.

Regulation of display can challenge or

excise a particular picture or portion of a total display without
violating the integrity of the whole as a single creative unit.
The display as a whole is not being suppressed;
affects

only

a

readily

divisible

segment.

regulation

Upper

Midwest

Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, supra, at 1393, 1394.

The

court there correctly concludes that the "as a whole" requirement
does not prevent the City from regulating the manner of display
of the offensive materials.

The portion of the total display

challenged here does not receive any "serious value" from the
other sketchings with which it is associated on the bed sheets;
the various parts of a display do not merge to constitute an
inviolate "whole work" as in the case of a book for sale.
17

f. * Even if the bed sheets were taken as a whole, there is
no dominant theme.

The Appellant tried to suffuse the offensive

depictions with a political message by testifying at trial that
the "whole depiction was supposed to be political in nature, more
or less, towards (sic) girls to not be a tramp or a whore", and
"for guys to watch out for girls like that" (Transcript, p. 228) .
In the language of Chief Justice Burger, the Appellant's efforts
to show a dominant political theme partake of "the fallacy of
seeking to use the First Amendment as a cloak for obviously
unlawful

public

sexual

conduct

by the diaphanous

device

of

attributing protected expressive attributes to that conduct."
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc. , 478 US 697 at 705, 106 S.Ct. 3172,
92 L.Ed. 2d 568 at 577.

The same is true of any effort to

establish an artistic theme as dominant.

The Appellant called an

artist as an expert witness, but apparently not daring to ask him
if

the

depiction

was

"artistic", he

political *5 (Transcript, p. 285).

asked

him

if

it were

This witness characterized

the work as graffiti, stating that a number of critics, but not
all critics, find graffiti to be a legitimate medium "for the use
of making art work" (Transcript, p. 284). This is the closest he
comes to calling the work "art", and it does not establish a

*5
It was interesting to learn that the art expert found no
formal political statements within the context presented.
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v. Slat 011,,, supra, 413 US at 56, the court stated:
"Nor was it error to fail to require 'expert'
affirmative evidence that the materials were
obscene when the materials themselves were
actually placed in evidence. United States v.
Groner, 479 F2d 577, 579-586, (CA5 1973); id.,
at 586-588 (Ainsworth, J., concurring); id.,
586-589 (Clark, J., concurring); United States
v. Wild, 422 F2d 34, 35-36 (CA2 1969), cert
denied, 402 US 986, 29 L.Ed.2d 152, 91 S.Ct.
1644 (1971); Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d
78, 84 (CA5), cert denied, 369 US 859, 8 L.Ed.2d
1 8, 82 S.Ct. 949 (1962); State v. Amato. 49
Wis 2d 638, 645, 183 NW2d 29, 32 (1971), cert
denied sub nom Amato v. Wisconsin. 404 US 1063,
30 L.Ed.2d 751, 92 S.Ct. 735 (1972). See Smith
v. California. 361 US 147, 172, 4 L.Ed.2d 205,
80 S.Ct. 215 (1959) (HarIan, I,, concurring and
dissenting); Unites States v. Brown. 328 F.Supp.
196, 199 (ED Va 1971). The films, obviously, are
the best evidence of what they represent. 'In the
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity
questions since Roth, it has regarded the materials
as sufficient in themselves for determination of the
question.' Ginzbura v. United States. 383 US 463,
465, i* T. Ed,2d 31, 86 S.Ct. 942 (1966)."

In note 6 on the same page the court elucidated further: ,
"This is not a subject that lends itself to the
traditional use of expert testimony• Such
testimony is usually admitted for the purpose of
explaining to lay jurors what they otherwise could
not understand• Cf. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence Sections
556, 559 (3d ed) (1940). No such assistance is
needed by jurors in obscenity cases; indeed the
'expert witness' practices employed in these cases
have often made a mockery out of the otherwise sound
concept of expert testimony, (cases omitted)11
Certainly where a contemporary community standard is involved, a
court cannot use the testimony of experts to overturn a jury
verdict.

It is recognized by the cases, and even by Justice

Brennan in a dissent that the availability of materials in a
community or the opinion of an expert about those materials may
be typical

of a minority

community standard.
317, n. 14.

only and need not conform to the

Smith v. United States, supra, 431 US 291 at

As for establishing a lack of serious literary,

political or artistic value, the work itself is sufficient for
that purpose.

Respondent

should not be required to put on

additional evidence to prove a negative.
materials

do

not

provide,

in

speaking

The only evidence the
for

themselves,

is

information about the community standards by which they are to be
judged;

the Respondent

is not constitutionally

required

to

introduce evidence of those standards. Hamlina v. United States,
supra, 418 US 807 at 104.

As pointed out in U.S. v. Various

Articles of Obscene Merchandise. 709 F.2d 132 at 135 (1983), the
trier of fact is free to decide that the materials introduced by
20
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As stated in Hamling v. United

States, supra, 418 US at l.<M:
"Petitioners also make a broad attack on the sufficiency
of the evidence. The general rule of application is
that "(t)he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there
is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable
to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United
States, 315 US 60, 86 L.Ed. 680, 62 S.Ct. 457 (1942)."
The trial court properly determined
byn1oin of proof.

u its

CONCLUSION
The challenged ordinance defined obscenity and described
offensive conduct within the parameters set our by Miller, and it
is neither so broad that it infringes on important constitutional
rights of free speech nor so vague that it in any way interferes
with the due process available to an accused.

As applied in this

case, the ordinance would expose Appellant to prosecution for
displaying two works (or subworks) that lewdly exhibit female
genitalia.

The Respondent's enforcement of the ordinance in this

manner was not unreasonable and does not violate the constitution
either of the United States or of the State of Utah (Appellant
does

not

argue

interpretation).

that
Guilt

there
under

is

any

the

difference

ordinance

as

in

their

charged

was

properly presented to a jury by the trial judge after crossing an
initial threshold that there was no clear and obvious political
or

artistic

content

of

serious

value,

and

that

there

was

sufficient possibility of prurient interest and offensive conduct
that it should be submitted to the jury.

The Respondent met its.

burden of proof by presenting evidence of the offending material
to the jury for application by it of the contemporary community
standard.

There is no error in the proceedings below that would

mandate a reversal by this court.
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